



Revolution in the News: The Story Behind Ukraine's Newsroom Revolt

A Report on the Ukrainian
Presidential Elections 2004
by the International Federation
of Journalists

International Federation of Journalists



Cover photos



Photos 1 & 2 'Tent City' at the height of the Orange Revolution on Khreschatyk Street Kiev, November-December 04



Photos 3 & 4 Journalists protest outside national TV channels UT-1 and 1+1 demanding the right to report without interference.



Photos 5 & 6 October 24, "journalists demonstrate on behalf of Channel 5 staff who went on hunger strike following government attempts to close them down. Sweeping the streets is a symbolic reminder of the Soviet period when dissidents were forced into jobs as street cleaners or care-takers."

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"I give you my word that all the high-profile cases closed by Kuchma will be revisited, commissions will be appointed and we will carry out full-scale investigations." Viktor Yushchenko Nov 18 on Gongadze

"WE, JOURNALISTS OF UT1 NEWS, ARE ON STRIKE Ukrainians, we have conquered our fear because there is an even stronger feeling: shame. We call on producers and editors to think hard about their duties to the people." statement issued by UT1 journalists on Nov 24

"When covering the event, do not give long shots of the rally and shots of the crowd; show only groups of drunk people with socially inappropriate deviant behaviour."
Tennik instructions to media on covering Yushchenko rally July 4

"The election results have been falsified. Don't believe them. Our president is Yushchenko. I'm sorry I've had to translate lies up to now, but I'm not doing it any more." UT1 presenting news in sign language for the deaf, Nov 25

"Today [Thursday] we reached a critical mass. We began to believe in ourselves, in what we could achieve. Tonight the editors gave us full freedom. Yesterday I was very scared. Today we are all very happy." Olga Kashpor, a reporter and another of the original 14 who started the UT-1

"The hesitant majority suddenly took action, it was all rather unexpected." Yegor Sobolev, the Kyiv organiser off the IMTUU

"It's a total breakthrough. It's a revolution on the TV -- today Ukrainian television started to work honestly for the first time. Andrei Shevchenko, news anchor on Channel 5,

"If Yanukovich had won, it would have been a black time for us. But Yushchenko's win will also be difficult. He wants to open the country to private Western capital. If that happens I am sure half the journalists will lose their jobs." Sergey Goos
IMTUU National Organiser

Introduction: Purpose of the IFJ missions to Ukraine	3
Background	
1. Ukraine: a turning point for Eastern Europe?	4
2. Media freedom since Gongadze	5
2.1 Attacks on journalists	5
2.2 Attacks on media companies	6
2.3 The shadow of censorship	7
The 2004 Presidential Elections	8
3. The roots of the 'Orange Revolution'.....	8
3.1 State interference in national media	8
3.1.i A nation divided	8
3.1.ii A nation misinformed	9
3.2. Interference in regional media	10
3.2.i Western Ukraine	10
3.2.ii Eastern Ukraine	12
4. Impact of the 'Orange Revolution'	15
4.1 Prelude to revolution	15
4.2 Hunger strike at Channel 5	17
4.3 The journalists' revolt on national TV	18
4.4 The immediate aftermath	22
5. Personal security of journalists.....	24
6. Access to information	25
7. Media ethics	25
8. Conclusions and Recommendations	26
Appendix.....	31

Introduction

Purpose of the IFJ missions to Ukraine

The International Federation of Journalists sent three missions to monitor the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004, which took place in three rounds – October 31, November 21 and December 26.

Two IFJ media experts visited Ukraine from October 24 – November 1, during which time they spoke to media experts, government officials including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Central Election Commission, and journalists from across a wide range of media. The IFJ observers also visited Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk. The mission held a press conference in Kyiv on Friday 29th October.

The IFJ experts then joined the ‘Crisis Centre’ established jointly by the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) and the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine (IMTUU) to monitor violations against media on the day of the elections. The mission was jointly hosted by the NUJU and IMTUU.

One IFJ media expert then returned to Kyiv on November 20. He again joined the journalists’ Crisis Centre on election day and then worked closely with the IMTUU in the first days of the ‘Orange Revolution’, issuing immediate responses to events and interviewing broadcast journalists involved in strikes and protests. He remained in Ukraine until December 3, giving interviews to international broadcast media about the media situation in the country.

Between the second and third rounds of voting, IFJ officials travelled to Kyiv for meetings with both the main journalists’ trade unions. The

mission met with a range of journalists who led the protests in the main broadcasters. It also held an open meeting on editorial independence, media reform and the impact of foreign investment.

An IFJ observer then returned to Ukraine on December 23 for the final round of the election, travelling to Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine. Here he interviewed journalists about the situation in the East, which remained overwhelmingly hostile to events in Kyiv. He left Ukraine on December 31.

The missions were tasked to:

- Record violations of press freedom and journalists’ rights during the election campaign;
- Assist the two main journalists’ unions in their monitoring programme, including providing on-the-spot responses and investigations into violations of press freedom as the need arose;
- Discuss with journalists the conditions under which they were reporting the elections;
- Make recommendations to Ukrainian journalists’ organisations, the authorities and international institutions regarding political pressure on journalists in Ukraine and media development programmes.

The situation after the first round of voting was extremely tense and fraught with danger for journalists, and for Ukrainian democracy as a whole. The IFJ therefore hurried to issue an interim report ‘Democracy in the News: Journalists Act Over Ukraine Media Bias’ on November 11, 2004.² Based on the findings of the first mission, the interim report highlighted

the dangers of the situation and pointed to immediate actions necessary to guarantee media freedoms.

With the elections over and a new president inaugurated, the IFJ is now well placed to assess the balance sheet of the 'Orange Revolution' in the media and identify the immediate problems facing journalists under the new presidency.

The current document is based on the interim report but brings a mass of new information concerning the period of the revolution itself. It ends with the IFJ's recommendations to Ukrainian national and local government, Ukrainian journalists' and media organisations, owners and controllers of Ukrainian media, and international bodies.

Background

1. Ukraine: a turning point for Eastern Europe?

The ripples from Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' are still fanning out across Ukraine itself, and also beyond its borders. A key focus of the revolution was the media. As in Serbia in 2000 and Georgia in 2003, a major theme of popular discontent was the way in which the incumbent regime manipulated the media to its own advantage. Would Ukraine's governing elite succeed in keeping a lid on discontent through its control of influential media? Or would the mass movement effectively denounce this control and inspire critical voices to re-establish editorial independence in the newsrooms?

After Leonid Kuchma was elected president in 1994, Ukraine followed an inconsistent course of reform. Economic reforms were undertaken, but as in neighbouring Russia there were reports of flawed privatisations benefiting members of the elite. There is copious evidence of corruption and organised crime during this period.³

Politically, however, the country had avoided Russian-style authoritarianism, characterised by

one-party domination of parliament. In another of Ukraine's immediate neighbours, Belarus, the situation was (and is) even worse, with routine persecution of the political opposition and independent media outlets.

Ukraine is therefore a pivotal country. Democracy and press freedom in the new European Union member states may be considered relatively secure, but in the EU's 'near abroad' -- Ukraine, Belarus and Russia -- the situation is unstable; the course which Ukraine takes will set an example for government and media in the region's two other major countries.

Before the revolution, the IFJ was extremely concerned that further piecemeal erosion of media freedom in Ukraine could become an avalanche, with serious adverse consequences for democracy and media freedom in the country and elsewhere in the region.

Now, however, there is every reason to hope that Ukrainian civil society has risen to the challenge and begun to reverse these trends. The consequence, we believe, could re-

invigorate democratic change throughout the region. The aim of this report is therefore to help strengthen journalists’ and press freedom organisations in Ukraine, and to alert international attention to the importance of their struggle.

The report will also, however, point to the powerful and enduring legacy of the pre-revolutionary system of centralised media control. It will highlight the new government’s duties in the media sphere and the obstacles journalists must overcome if the gains they have made are to be reinforced and built upon.

2. Media freedom since Gongadze

In the media field there have been deeply worrying developments in Ukraine in recent years. The following brief discussion is essential background to the IFJ’s monitoring of media practice during the presidential elections.

• 2.1 ATTACKS ON JOURNALISTS

In September 2000, Georgy Gongadze, a journalist known for his strident criticisms of (now former) president Kuchma, went missing. Two months later his decapitated corpse was found in a ditch. The murder remains unsolved, but there is evidence that the government and the prosecutor general may have obstructed investigations into the case. There are also indications that members of government may have been involved in Gongadze’s disappearance.

Recent revelations have reignited the issue, which remains a test case for media freedom in Europe.⁴ A measure of the importance of this case in Ukrainian politics is the fact that both candidates for the presidency made a point of promising to solve the murder should they be re-elected. On November 18, 2004, Viktor

Yushchenko told foreign journalists who asked him about the Gongadze case:

‘I give you my word that all the high-profile cases closed by Kuchma will be revisited, commissions will be appointed and we will carry out full-scale investigations.’

Mr Yushchenko guaranteed that his presidency would work to stop the persecution of journalists and that they would be able to work freely: ‘Now the overwhelming majority of the political elite, journalists and business circles understand one thing – a free press is an inalienable part of the progress’ of Ukrainian society.⁵

The Gongadze case is but one of many which demonstrate that Ukraine has been a hazardous place for journalists. In December 2003 the Vienna based International Press Institute estimated that 18 journalists had died in Ukraine since 1991 because of their work. Many of these cases remain unsolved or are disputed, and there have been accusations that the police failed to carry out proper investigations.⁶

Physical attacks on journalists have continued, usually for carrying out their professional duties. The Kyiv-based watchdog the Institute for Mass Information observed almost twice as many (42 versus 23) incidents of threats and attacks on journalists in 2003 as in the previous year.⁷

In January 2004, Yuri Mykhailovych and another journalist from Kirovohrad were attacked by unknown individuals; Mr Mykhailovych suffered a brain injury. He was the head of the Freedom of Speech Information Centre and formerly an oblast TV and radio journalist.⁸

In March 2004, Heorhiy Chechyk, director of the private radio station Radio Yuta in Poltava, died in a car crash in mysterious circumstances. He had been driving to a meeting with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to discuss broadcasting their Ukrainian Service news bulletin. Mr Chechyk had complained about interference in his journalism by the authorities.⁹

In August 2004, Dmitry Shkuropat, a correspondent for the daily Iskra in the city of Zaporizhia was beaten up on his way to the newspaper's office, together with a staff member of the news agency Interfax. Mr Shkuropat suspects he was attacked because of his investigation into regional crime and possible complicity of the local authorities. Tapes of interviews and other materials related to his investigation disappeared after the incident.¹⁰

Although the IFJ is unaware of physical attacks, threats or intimidation of journalists proved to be directly related to the 2004 election campaign, the Gongadze case and other incidents had created a climate of fear. This could not fail to put pressure on journalists to self-censor their work.

• 2.2 ATTACKS ON MEDIA COMPANIES

While individual journalists could find themselves facing intimidation and threats, the situation also evolved to include pressure on entire titles or companies in the media sphere.

On 3 March 2004, Radio Kontinent was raided and taken off the air by officials of the state body responsible for monitoring compliance with broadcasting regulations. The raid and closure occurred only a few days after Radio Kontinent started re-broadcasting daily two-hour news bulletins of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Radio Kontinent also

used to transmit the news programmes of BBC, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, Polish Radio and the local station Hromadske Radio. The official reason for taking the station off the air was that its licence had expired, despite the fact that it had already expired in 2001 in the course of a bitter legal battle.

On February 17, the private radio station Dovira announced it would cease re-broadcasting RFE/RL news bulletins, after five years of re-broadcasts. The announcement came only one month after Serhiy Kychyhyn, a known supporter of president Kuchma, became the general producer of Dovira radio.¹¹

For several months before its closure, Radio Kontinent had complained of harassment from the tax service and general prosecutor's office. Immediately after the closure, the station's director and owner, Sergiy Sholokh (also a witness in the Gongadze case), fled abroad; in August 2004 he was granted refugee status in the USA. Mr Sholokh claimed to have received repeated threats to his life, including from the Security Service of Ukraine.¹²

The closure of Radio Kontinent is but a recent example of widespread instances of political, economic and indirect pressure on the mass media, which had unfortunately become typical for Ukraine. In 2003 The Institute for Mass Information (IMI) documented 38 such cases, up from 30 the year before; arbitrary tax inspections were a common method. In 2003 the IMI also learned of 46 legal suits filed against the mass media and journalists, up from 38 in 2002. Most frequently the cases were brought for 'slander, moral and material damages and losses to a business reputation'.¹³

In late 2003 a court case was instituted against the newspaper Silski Visti for printing anti-Semitic articles. A year later the case seemed to be lingering in a legal limbo; the editor-

in-chief expected it to be dropped soon after the presidential elections.¹⁴ The case has been highly controversial: opposition leaders such as Viktor Yushchenko and Oleksandr Moroz said the attempt to close the paper was part and parcel of government campaigns against opposition media.

There can be little doubt that the paper committed a disgraceful error in printing the articles in question. However, Josef Zissels, chair of the Va’ad of Ukraine, a leading Jewish organisation, has pointed out that there is little evidence that the authorities are serious about fighting anti-Semitism, since scurrilous anti-Semitic publications have been allowed to be sold freely every day in central Kyiv under the watchful eyes of the police. ‘[The government’s] decision to go after Silski Visti is clearly connected with the fact that it is the largest opposition publication,’ Mr Zissels said not long before the election.¹⁵

The case has been costly for Silski Visti. In Ukraine, newspaper subscriptions are paid for through the postal service, and in many cases local post offices in the regions had refused to accept renewal of subscriptions, stating that the paper had been ‘closed’. This cost the newspaper tens of thousands of subscriptions in the summer of 2004 when annual subscriptions were due for renewal.¹⁶

In the election context, the case of Channel 5 (see below) closely follows the pattern of the administrative attacks outlined above.

• 2.3 THE SHADOW OF CENSORSHIP

Up until November 2004, all major national TV channels but one (Channel 5) were under tight central control. The presidential administration regularly issued unofficial, secret directions – the so-called temniki (singular: temnik) – to the media on how to cover various stories,

usually so as to portray the president and pro-presidential parties in a positive light and to discredit the opposition. As a result, media coverage, especially by the national TV networks, was deeply biased and unbalanced in favour of the political establishment.

The practice of issuing temniki has been widely documented. The internet publication *Ukrainska Pravda* has obtained and published several temniki, including orders of the presidential administration to ignore negative international reaction to events in Ukraine. These particularly affected the three national television channels in which Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration, had either investments or a strong influence – namely UT-1, 1+1 and Inter TV.

For example, on March 11, 2004, when the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Ukraine, some 10 temniki were circulated. One of these stated: ‘On March 18, information about the EU Resolution on the situation around the freedom of speech in Ukraine was made public. Commentary: no mention of any information about it.’ The EU Resolution was consequently not reported by any of the three main television channels.¹⁷

A temnik reportedly issued on July 4 instructed journalists how to cover opposition leader Yushchenko’s first election rally: ‘When covering the event, do not give long shots of the rally and shots of the crowd; show only groups of drunk people with socially inappropriate deviant behaviour.’¹⁸

Events immediately preceding the first round of voting at the presidential election demonstrated that the practice was still highly influential (see below).

The 2004 Presidential Elections

3. Roots of the 'Orange Revolution'

3.1 STATE INTERFERENCE IN THE NATIONAL MEDIA

• 3.1.1 A NATION DIVIDED

The elections took place against the background of a deep polarization in Ukrainian society between support for the two main presidential candidates: the (now former) prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich, and the leader of the 'Our Ukraine' bloc, Viktor Yushchenko. Each received almost exactly 40 per cent of the vote at the first round on October 31.

Mr Yanukovich enjoyed the privileges of the incumbent in terms of quantity of media coverage by the main state-controlled television channels – the so-called 'administrative resource' that meant (among other things) that news items about the government doubled as political advertising. But Mr Yanukovich enjoyed much more than this: coverage of the prime minister was overwhelmingly positive, while that of the challenger, Mr Yushchenko, was overwhelmingly negative. The Ukrainian Press Academy, which monitors the content of TV broadcasts, documented a steady increase in negative reporting of Mr Yushchenko in the months and weeks leading up to the vote.¹⁹

The Academy also noted the dominance of one-sided electoral news reports without any attempt to present alternative points of view; such reports constituted some 90 per cent of all TV news output. In October only one in nine news reports mentioned the source of their information, compared to one in six in September.²⁰

Public opinion in Ukraine was – and still remains – sharply divided between the north-west, which is predominantly Ukrainian-speaking and supports Mr Yushchenko, and the south-east, which is predominantly Russian-speaking and supports Mr Yanukovich; Mr Yanukovich was strongly supported by Russian politicians, including the Kremlin. This division was reflected in the local print media (see below), but not by the central TV channels, which emphasised and deepened the division by criticizing Mr Yushchenko's supporters in the north-west.

The director of the National Television Company of Ukraine (NTCU) defended the extensive coverage of Mr Yanukovich on the main TV channels by referring to the stations' legal obligation to highlight the government's activities. He also pointed to a great deal of detailed and partially contradictory rules for media coverage of the election campaign, enforced by the central election commission, plus difficulties caused by the number of candidates – 26 in total.

This led the NTCU to treat the election campaign in an unusual manner that was not helpful to the public. Debates between the 26 candidates, of which most had no hope of receiving more than a tiny fraction of the vote, were arranged as 13 one-hour debates between two randomly selected candidates. In three instances, one of the participating candidates was so unsatisfied with their selected opponent that they withdrew from the programme; the other participant then had the full hour's programme to themselves.²¹

It should also be noted that political advertising, to which all candidates were entitled, was used by minor candidates – so-called ‘technical candidates’ – mainly to attack Mr Yushchenko rather than advance positive programmes of their own.

Media owned by the state or regional authorities were forbidden, according to the law on the presidential election, to speak or write negatively about any candidate – violations would lead to their closure for the remaining period of the election campaign. The editor-in-chief of parliament’s daily newspaper, *Holos Ukrainy*, told of one such incident: in the town of Vinnitsya a newspaper was temporarily closed after a complaint by the Communist Party.²²

The national newspaper *Ukraina Moloda*, which favours Mr Yushchenko, was the object of 10 official complaints by Mr Yanukovich’s election headquarters after the paper wrote that Mr Yanukovich behaved ‘like a cheap actor and a clown’ after being hit by an egg. The paper feared that one of these complaints might go to court.²³

In short, however, the IFJ believes that the law failed utterly to address the woeful election coverage on the national television channels, which were the main source of information for millions of Ukrainians.

• 3.1.II A NATION MISINFORMED

Serhyi Taran, director of the Institute of Mass Information and author of numerous reports on the media in Ukraine, summed up the pre-election situation as follows: ‘Yanukovich receives much more coverage than Yushchenko, by an order of magnitude. Moreover, news about Yushchenko is always negative, always connected with the word ‘conflict’. This has

trained the viewer’s reflex reaction to connect Yushchenko with extremism and conflict.’²⁴

Mr Taran explained this in terms of censorship of the main TV channels organized by the presidential administration: ‘Censorship is directly proportional to the audience size of the media in question. The greater the influence of any media, the greater the censorship.’

He offered two simple proofs that censorship existed. Firstly, there was the astonishing similarity of the information on TV stations which ought to have been competitors. They repeated precisely the same information, pointing to the existence of *temniki*.

Secondly, these channels represented the position of the presidential administration. Yet the current and previous elections, and opinion polls, indicated that oppositional views were shared by large numbers of the population. If television channels worked according to democratic principles, they would have reflected these views. The fact that they didn’t suggested that they were under political control.

The conversations that IFJ observers had with Ukrainian journalists in a variety of different media provided no evidence to undermine Mr Taran’s analysis, but plenty to support it.

The one-sided and inflammatory nature of television news coverage was exemplified by reporting of events in Kyiv on Saturday, October 23. Fighting broke out between Mr Yushchenko’s supporters and the police late that evening. All the central TV channels, plus many national newspapers who openly supported Mr Yanukovich, portrayed the incident as wanton, unprovoked hooliganism by Mr Yushchenko, his supporters and ‘Our Ukraine’ members of parliament. Only Channel 5 and a few opposition newspapers attempted to investigate the root cause of the violence, carrying

eyewitness statements that it began when plain-clothes policemen attacked demonstrators.

When asked about the incident, Anatoly Prisyazhnyuk, deputy interior minister, said Channel 5 had 'distorted the situation 100 per cent' by suggesting that the police had started the fighting. Of opposition MPs' relations with the police, he said: 'Even the Americans don't treat Iraqi prisoners as bad as that.'²⁶ His remarks were typical of the tone of the main news coverage of this incident.

The IFJ is convinced, on the basis of the information at our disposal, that the practice of issuing temniki was in widespread use during the pre-election period. However, the temniki were only distributed to media that could be expected to follow them -- the presidential administration appeared to have given up on oppositional media. This might have been because of instances where opposition media had published the temniki they received, instead of following them.

3.2 INTERFERENCE IN REGIONAL MEDIA

Local administrations at city or oblast (regional) level often operate their own TV stations and print media. Private media are also common, but the publicly owned media have some of their costs covered from city or oblast budgets. In some instances, the employees of TV stations or newspapers are co-owners of the company and have a say in the appointment of editors.

Serious forms of harassment of oppositional regional media, especially from the tax authorities, still seemed to be persistent during the pre-election period. On March 15 a moratorium on tax inspections in media companies during the election campaign was announced by president Kuchma -- this regulation helped to improve the situation.

3.2.1 WESTERN UKRAINE

In contrast to eastern regions of Ukraine, the local administration in Lviv has almost no media of its own: just one small weekly paper. There are also three small papers owned by the SDPU(o), the political party of the head of the presidential administration, Viktor

Who controls Ukrainian TV?²⁵

During the election period, ownership and control of television broadcasting was as follows:

- The two largest TV channels -- Inter and 1+1 -- together enjoy about 60% of the total TV audience. They, together with the medium-sized channel UT-1, are controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration. Inter even employs a 'censor' as a member of staff.
- There are four other medium-sized channels -- ICTV, STB, Novyi Kanal and Era. The first three of these are under the control of Viktor Pinchuk, president Kuchma's son-in-law
- Smaller channels, such as Channel 5, Tonis, NTN and TRK Ukraina, do not follow the temniki. Channel 5, which is owned by a businessman sympathetic to Mr Yushchenko, has experienced constant attempts to limit its output and close it down altogether

Medvedchuk. In contrast, the large regional newspapers (Postup, Ekspress, Lvovska Gazeta and Vysokii Zamok) favour Mr Yushchenko.

• VYSOKYI ZAMOK

The Lviv newspaper Vysokyi Zamok reported that in the run-up to the 2004 presidential elections its kiosks had been temporarily shut by the tax authorities because the kiosks, placed in a subsidiary company, were not considered a media company and thus not covered by the moratorium on tax inspections.

On October 1 Vysokyi Zamok published information that Ukrainian customs officials wanted bribes to let people out of the country. The next day over 100 militia descended on 60 kiosks selling the paper in Lviv and outside the town. They stopped the kiosks working for three days.

‘We lost a lot of money,’ editor-in-chief Stepan Kurpil said. ‘We hadn’t seen anything like this before – there had been checks, but never lasting more than a couple of hours. They accused us of breaking the tax laws in three kiosks.’

The paper had experienced a similar problem three years ago before the parliamentary elections. The tax inspector then told the paper’s accountant that he had been given the task of fining it 2 million hryvna (approximately €350,000). Vysokyi Zamok threatened to publish this information and the investigation was halted. All the same, it was a blow to the paper’s reputation and it scared off advertisers. At the time, the paper’s printing house was the only publisher of Yulia Tymoshenko’s national newspaper, Vechernyie Vesti; Ms Tymoshenko, a controversial figure and a major backer of Yushchenko’s ‘Our Ukraine’ bloc, was appointed prime minister in January 2005.²⁷

For over a year the newspaper had been unable to implement plans to change the printing process, allegedly because of obstruction from the local administration.

• LVIVSKA GAZETA

The experience of another Lviv newspaper suggests that the elections actually meant less harassment for some regional media.

Lvivska Gazeta is a daily business title; it is three years old. The paper doesn’t hide its support for Mr Yushchenko. Its owner is a young businessman with a chain of women’s clothes shops.

The tax inspectors had taken out 10 court cases against the newspaper since it had been established; the paper lost them all. Editor-in-chief Oleg Bazar said: ‘For example, we re-printed material from a Polish newspaper, and they sued us. The law says you have to sue the original source, but the judge ruled we had translated it into Ukrainian, so we were now the original source. The fine wasn’t large but we lost 60 per cent of our advertisers in a month because of it.’

In the summer of 2003, the authorities also obstructed the paper’s distributors, resulting in a 30 per cent loss of sales. Then there was an attempt to confiscate computers because of unlicensed software.

However, from the start of the election campaign attempts to persecute the newspaper ceased, Mr Bazar said. ‘With the start of the election campaign, all this stopped. Now they are putting pressure on the owners instead.’

He added: ‘Newspapers are more independent, especially in the regions, although the government has 100 per cent control over

the TV. We have no problem with access to information.²⁸

• MIST: A SUSPICIOUSLY UNLUCKY REGIONAL TV STATION

A series of highly unusual incidents at a Lviv TV station which broadcasts material sympathetic to the opposition suggested a concerted attempt to drive it off the air.

TV company Mist was one of the first independent television channels in Ukraine. It is a Ukrainian-Canadian joint venture. Some 70 per cent of its output consists of re-broadcasts of material produced by Channel 5. Ninety per cent of viewers in Lviv watch this channel. The telephones at Mist were ringing off the hook during the hunger strike at Channel 5 as viewers phoned in their support, according to commercial director Yulia Zvolinska.

Since it started operating in 1993, the station 'had no problems whatsoever', Ms Zvolinska said. But on the night of October 19, 2004, the station's premises were flooded, destroying archives and the advertising department. Then the following night (October 20) someone attacked the cable carrying the signal. For four hours the station was unable to broadcast. 'This was done by people who knew what they were doing,' Ms Zvolinska told the IFJ.

The following night (October 21) there was a fire in the main fuse box in the premises. It didn't interrupt broadcasts, but the next day the broadcast team had to wear face masks because of the fumes. For five days the people living in the block of flats above were without electricity and water.

On the night of October 25 there was another fire in the same fuse box. By this time the station had moved the journalists and its broadcasting operation to another location. The

police and electricians say the fuse box fires were arson; the fire service says they were not.

3.2.ii EASTERN UKRAINE

East Ukraine is the stronghold of (now former) prime minister Viktor Yanukovich, who received over 96 per cent of the vote in some industrial centres. Here the events in Kyiv and the west of the country were greeted with anger and even fear. For example, at a meeting of some 150,000 people in Donetsk a few days after the second round of voting, political leaders told the crowd that 'fascists' and 'terrorists' were coming to power in Kyiv. The strength of this mood led to fears that the East might separate and the country break up.

The tensions in the East have not come about overnight. When Mr Yushchenko tried to hold a political congress in Donetsk in October, 2003, tens of thousands of people came out to protest and his plane was unable land. When finally it did, he was unable to leave the airport.

The situation reflects the dominance of East Ukrainian business and political leaders in central government -- the so-called 'Donetsk clan'. Mr Yanukovich himself was governor of Donetsk region before becoming prime minister; Ukraine's richest man, Rinat Akhmetov, is based in Donetsk, where he wields enormous influence. Akhmetov controls 98 per cent of TRK Ukraina, a Donetsk-based television station which is broadcast nationwide. The bulk of the print media in the city is also owned and controlled by Akhmetov.²⁹

In consequence, the media environment in Eastern Ukraine differs significantly from the West. Journalists in the East are much less likely to find themselves faced with temniki or other limits imposed on their work. Unfortunately, however, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the output journalists produce

falls far short of internationally accepted standards. This is also true of some Eastern media that support Mr Yushchenko.³⁰

• DONETSK
Independent Donetsk journalists who are critical of both sides in the presidential conflict explain the situation as follows.

At the 1999 presidential elections, president Kuchma reached an agreement with the 'Donetsk clan' that he wouldn't interfere in their affairs, so long as they could deliver him the votes he needed. In Western Ukraine Mr Kuchma used the Communist Party as a means of encouraging people to vote for him as the lesser of two evils. In the East, however, the Communists remained popular, and so the election in the East had to be controlled ruthlessly from above. As a result, any residual independence in the Eastern media was finally wiped out. Boris Kolesnikov, chair of the Donetsk regional council and closely linked to Mr Akhmetov, instituted a regime of strict control of the region's media.³¹

Take the weekly newspaper Salon, for example. It belonged to its editor-in-chief, Leonid Tsodikov. Established in 1995, Salon was a successful business and a highly profitable title, and was therefore independent from any of Ukraine's wealthy 'oligarchs'. Then Mr Akhmetov purchased it and it changed sharply for the worse. Tsodikov remained on the newspaper in a management role. The professional journalists left the newspaper, many moving to Kyiv. Their places were filled by inexperienced and unqualified staff.

Volodymyr Boyko, formerly a reporter on Salon and now based in Kyiv, says the example of Salon was repeated throughout the press in Donetsk region. 'The epitome of talentlessness is Donbasskie Novosti. The staff openly declare

that newspapers ought to be propagandistic. Even in the USSR there was no such thing as this, and journalists wrote so that you could read between the lines.

'No one buys newspapers like these for their news. Salon remains popular because of its colour supplements, for example. Many titles are forcibly distributed: all pensioners are required to take out a subscription to Veteran, for example. The stated print run is one thing, but how many are sold is quiet another.'

The Donetsk-based television channel TRK Ukraina is also a mouthpiece for the Eastern elite. Ironically it started out as the first independent municipal television station in the USSR at the end of the perestroika period. In 2000, however, Mr Akhmetov combined all the local Donetsk TV channels into one as TRK Ukraina, which also began to broadcast nationally. The station is headed by a former Soviet TV correspondent, Gennady Kondaurov.

TRK Ukraina went to extraordinary lengths to denigrate Mr Yushchenko, editing his words to make them seem that he meant something completely different. During the election campaign, for example, Yushchenko said that he was 'ready to go down on my knees before the miners'. This quote was edited and repeatedly shown on TRK Ukraina as if Yushchenko had said he wanted to force the miners to go down on their knees.

Similarly, the words of opposition leader Yulia Timoshenko in parliament were twisted to make it seem that she had called for Donetsk region to be surrounded by barbed wire and cut off from the rest of Ukraine. After the revolutionary events in the West, when it was already becoming clear that the opposition would win the election, Mr Akhmetov himself admitted that Ms Timoshenko had not used these words.³²

Sergei Harmash, a journalist on the independent internet publication Ostrov, adds that many Donetsk journalists have been in their jobs since Soviet times and therefore behave as ideologists and propagandists. 'They are not accustomed to working as journalists,' he says.

Consequently there have been very few protests by journalists against the bias of the media on which they work. The deputy editor of the newspaper Donbass walked out of his job in October, 2004, because of the paper's position, but this is a notable exception.

Mr Harmash concludes: 'It's the journalists themselves who are strangling freedom of speech in Donetsk. It's self-censorship.'

As an extreme example of this, he points to journalists' reactions to the brutal murder of local television journalist Ihor Oleksandrov in the summer of 2001.

Oleksandrov was well known for his reports on how the police and courts were linked with and covering for criminals in the region. The journalist found two former policemen who were willing to talk about this on air. Oleksandrov took the story to Kyiv and received independent proof that his information was correct. At this point he was murdered: he was attacked and died of serious head injuries on July 7, 2001, in the town of Slavyansk, northern Donetsk region.

The case caused a storm of interest when the prosecutor accused a homeless person of the murder, but a court set him free.

'The case had a major impact here,' Mr Harmash says. 'It's the only instance in which it has been proved that a journalist was killed for their journalism, not for something else.'

'I was scared, because I was reporting the case for [respected Kyiv weekly] Zerkalo Nedeli. However, the murder didn't make other journalists here scared. On the contrary, they said things like: 'He had it coming to him.' It was very unpleasant.'³³

Mr Harmash says that his publication, Ostrov, which survives on grants from organisations such as the US Embassy, is not persecuted by the Donetsk authorities. However, it appears that Mr Boyko was victimised for his work. In May, 2002, he was arrested in the editorial offices of Salon and briefly jailed. At the time, his main publications were in the internet publication Ukraina Kriminalna, which specialised in exposing corruption in high places.

There were international protests about the arrest, and Mr Boyko was released after 10 days. President Kuchma criticised the arrest and demanded an investigation.

• KHARKIV

On 18 October, 2004, police searched the second home near the eastern town of Kharkiv of Natalia Stativko, editor of the online magazine Obiektiv-No. Ms Stativko says the search was clearly linked to her work as a journalist and to the presidential election. Two weeks before the incident she had spoken at a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), denouncing violations of free expression in Ukraine. Obiektiv-No is known for publishing critical materials about the police.

Ms Stativko told the IFJ: 'The militia came to my dacha and broke into it. They behaved very strangely. A neighbour asked what they were doing and they showed her their identification. I complained to the local prosecutor, who appointed a commission which concluded that nothing untoward had taken place: the

police had seen an open window and went to investigate, they said.

‘But everything in the house had been turned upside down. It was clear they were looking for something. No one has explained to me what they were doing.

‘I wrote another letter and met the police chief. He said yes, your rights have been infringed. I was given a document stating that the policemen involved had been disciplined.

‘The search took place on the Monday after I had returned from Warsaw, where I had spoken at a meeting of the OSCE on human rights. As a result I was unable to work for three weeks, I was so upset.

‘But a lot has been published about it and I have received a great deal of support from other journalists. So solidarity exists.’

Obiektiv-No is part of a group of media including a newspaper, radio station and TV news. The paper has a substantial print run of some 6,000 copies. The company employs 50 staff, of which 15 are journalists.

The group claims to strive for objectivity, Ms Stativko says, adding: ‘In this country, if you criticise the authorities you will be accused of being an oppositionist. We try to be neutral. I can’t say we are 100 per cent neutral, but we do our best.’

However, this neutral position is not typical for Kharkiv media, where most publications are on the side of the authorities. In general, the main problem is that journalists feel they have to self-censor their work to avoid provoking the authorities.

‘The main problem is that the owner gets threatening phone calls. There have been no

threats to journalists. Sometimes we are refused accreditation, so there is some indirect pressure on us.

‘But our owner covers for us. He doesn’t tell us how to report on the elections. However, we are forced not to publish certain things, for example about privatisations. We censor ourselves. Self-censorship is the biggest problem for Ukrainian journalism.’³⁴

4. Impact of the ‘Orange Revolution’

Time line of key developments during the election campaign

• 4.1 PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION

In the week before the second round of voting, attacks by the authorities on the media continued.

Tuesday’s issue of *Silski Visti* (November 16) was blocked at the printers and was not distributed for several days. The entire print run of this major national daily remained at the printers. The issue carried a large interview with Mr Yushchenko – the number had been produced with Mr Yushchenko’s backing and with an extra large print run. A week before the paper had produced a special issue on Yanukovich.

Saturday’s issue of *Den* (November 20) didn’t come out – the first time in eight years that the national daily had not reached its readers. It’s editorial was critical of Mr Yanukovich, and the paper reportedly declined to print the text of a report by a parliamentary commission investigating accusations that Mr Yushchenko had been poisoned (the report said no evidence had yet been found to confirm he had been poisoned). Over the weekend the paper’s owners, linked to the government, tried to replace the editor, Oleg Ivantsov, but journalists refused

to accept his replacement, Valery Stepanyuk, who previously worked as a state censor on TV channels Inter and 1+1.

In the city of Sumi in northern Ukraine, on Thursday (November 18) unknown persons seized some 500 copies of the weekly newspaper Panorama from sellers at the city's central market, saying that the paper was 'opposed to the government' and contained pro-opposition leaflets. The staff rejected these accusations, pointing out that if a paper was not actively pro-Yanukovich it was automatically accused of being pro-Yushchenko. On the day of the first round of elections (October 31), a tear gas canister had exploded in the building housing the Panorama offices and the offices of radio station Nochnoi Dozor, with which the newspaper collaborates closely. Several staff had been injured by the gas.

In Kharkiv, eastern Ukraine, a week before the first round of the elections police attempted to close down the printers where weekly newspaper Obiektiv is printed. When the

printers refused, police were stationed at the gates and stopped and checked every car going in. Newspapers then started to appear that looked similar to other well-known newspapers, but were full of propaganda; also 'opposition' leaflets appeared with extremist demands, such as calls for civil war.

In Nikolaev, in southern Ukraine, the weekly paper Yuzhnaya Pravda was printed on Thursday (November 18) but was not distributed. Journalists on the paper interpreted the problems as a repeat of the scenario observed at Silski Visti, and saw it as just one of 'a mass of such instances in Ukraine'.³⁵

On election day (November 21) and the days immediately afterwards, there were frequent reports of pressure on the media. In particular, there were renewed fears of attacks on TV station Channel 5, prompted by an emergency session of the National Council on Radio and TV Broadcasting on October 23 amidst fears that the session would revoke Channel 5's license; protests prevented the session from

Election Timeline

Date	Event
October 18th	Channel 5 bank accounts frozen
October 25th	Channel 5 hunger strike starts
October 28th	42 broadcast journalists issue statement refusing to publish lies. Over 300 more sign within next two weeks
October 29th	President Kuchma attacks protesting journalists
October 31st	FIRST ROUND OF ELECTIONS
November 20th	National Silsi Visti prevented from distributing
November 21st	SECOND ROUND OF ELECTIONS
November 24th	Yanukovich declared winner
November 24th	14 journalists announce strike at UT1
November 25th	330 more staff joined the strike. By evening UT1 broadcasting objective news
	Strikes and independence spread to other national broadcasters Inter and 1+1
December 26th	Election Re-run

taking place. Channel 5 continued to be blacked out in the regions, however: on the morning of October 24 the channel’s signal was cut off in Odessa, and for the previous few days there had been no signal in Uzhgorod (a major town in western Ukraine). In Kyiv on October 23 the signal was temporarily cut off in several parts of the city.

Commenting on the situation, Valery Ivanov, head of the Ukrainian Press Academy said: ‘I constantly expect an attempt to close down the channel. The stakes are very high. The government is weighing up the advantages of closing down the station against the protests this would provoke.’

The journalists’ union IMTUU told the IFJ that its members across the country were experiencing problems. The state postal service had refused to distribute the newspaper MIG in Zaporizhie, eastern Ukraine; sellers of the newspaper Panorama in Sumi (north-West Ukraine) were threatened by skinheads on October 23; radio stations well-known for their independent broadcasting in Kharkiv were cut off yesterday just five minutes before a mass meeting in support of opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko.

• 4.2 HUNGER STRIKE AT CHANNEL 5

On Monday October 25, less than a week before the first round of elections, staff at Channel 5 went on hunger strike. The ‘rolling’ hunger strike involved all 250 employees in a protest against attempts to force the station off the air; at any one time, 20 employees were on hunger strike for a 24-hour period.

Channel 5 is a new TV station, barely one year old, but in that short space of time it had built a reputation for independent and critical news reporting. Unlike its rivals, the station had given air time to Mr Yushchenko and his supporters.

Channel 5 is owned by Petro Poroshenko, a businessman close to Mr Yushchenko. This had made it a target for the government and for pro-government businessmen and politicians. Channel 5 experienced constant problems with its license to broadcast, with the frequency on which it broadcasts, and with the cable operators on which it relies to get its signal into Ukrainian homes across the country.

Channel 5 complained about tax inspections that seemed to be used as an instrument for blocking the company’s work. Moreover, the station claimed that the National Broadcasting Council had given out hundreds of licenses, but not to Channel 5. In Spring 2003 the station had requested nation-wide frequencies: by law the station should have received a reply within two weeks, but 18 months later had heard nothing. During that period the National Broadcasting Council had issued some 300 frequencies, mostly in the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine.

Over the summer of 2004, Channel 5 was repeatedly taken off the air. In June, the Donbasstemerezhza and Ukrtelemerezhza cable operators stopped carrying the channel on the cable networks in Donetsk and some cities of the Donetsk region. The same thing reportedly happened in Dniprodzerzhinsk and Novomoskovsk. On 29 June, following the channel’s broadcasting of parliamentary sessions, the director of its cable company and his deputy were arrested and charged with a number of offences, including violating their broadcasting licence, money laundering and broadcasting pornographic materials.³⁶

In August there was periodic jamming of Channel 5 broadcasts in Kirovohrad. The broadcasts were also discontinued in the residential district of Uzhhorod, where approximately 120,000 people live. The same month, cable operator Falstap stopped broadcasting Channel 5 in Dnipropetrovsk.

After a demonstration in front of the Dnipropetrovsk regional administration by approximately 50,000 people, Falstap resumed the broadcasting of Channel 5.³⁷

The last straw for the station's staff came when, on October 13, a parliamentary deputy, Vladimir Sivkovich, went to court to seize two of the station's bank accounts after it broadcast accusations about Mr Sivkovich's investigation of a mysterious illness suffered by Mr Yushchenko, claimed by the opposition leader to be a result of poisoning by the security services. On the next day the station's license to broadcast was revoked and on October 18 two of its bank accounts were seized.

Revocation of licenses is an unusual event. Moreover, Channel 5 received the judicial revocation almost on the same day as its bank accounts were frozen. The station saw a clear connection between these two events and perceived them as a new level of pressure against the company.

On October 20 the management of Channel 5, with the backing of the workforce, issued an ultimatum that staff would begin a hunger strike at 21.00 on Monday October 25 if the following four demands were not met:

- The bank accounts to be released;
- The license to broadcast be restored;
- Cable operators to restore the signal;
- Mr Sivkovich to apologise publicly to Channel 5 staff.

These demands were not met and the hunger strike went ahead. The protest received coverage in opposition media but was ignored by state-controlled television.

The action had a rapid impact, however. The station's bank accounts were restored, as was its signal in Donetsk. Mr Sivkovich apologised live on air over the telephone. The question of

the station's license to broadcast was resolved a week later, and the hunger strike ended.

During the protest Channel 5 was flooded with messages of support from journalists and the public. The station's journalists believe their protest helped to strengthen the solidarity of journalists on other stations.³⁸

Journalists at Channel 5 also took part in a protest organised by the IMTUU on Sunday, October 24. The action consisted of journalists sweeping the streets to show that they were being robbed of the right to pursue their chosen profession.

• 4.3 THE JOURNALISTS' REVOLT ON NATIONAL TELEVISION³⁹

On Thursday, October 28, 42 television journalists in Kyiv made a public declaration that they would no longer broadcast 'lies and distortions'. The journalists' decision was announced at an open-air press conference in the capital. The journalists, from five television channels (Inter, 1+1, ICTV, Novyi Kanal and Tonis), signed a statement that they would strictly observe their professional ethics, refusing to compile unsourced reports and ignore alternative points of view.

Within two days their number grew to 180 from 18 TV channels. By mid-November over 300 had signed the statement. On ICTV a majority of journalists signed, while on UT-1 a majority of news journalists signed.

In 2002 a similar statement was issued during the parliamentary elections and received 400 signatures. But there were two major differences: this time the protest was focused on broadcast journalists, whereas in 2002 any journalist could sign. Also, the most recent statement pledged the journalists themselves to action -- they refused to work on professionally

unethical reports. In 2002 the statement was much more of a gesture.

In consequence, TV news and news analysis marginally but noticeably improved (although only temporarily) in the days after the journalists’ statement appeared. On the day after, the public channel UT-1 broadcast for the first time an interview with Mr Yushchenko. That evening it broadcast an interview with Nikolai Tomenko, head of the parliamentary Committee on Free Speech – apparently this would have been unheard of earlier. Examples of obvious lies and propaganda briefly disappeared. On the contrary, some sound and balanced reports were broadcast, such as a report on Inter about elections in Abkhazia, and a report on Novyi Kanal about alleged ‘planting’ of grenades on opposition organisations in Lviv.

The editor-in-chief of Inter told journalists they could make whatever reports they like, although he reserved the right not to broadcast them.⁴⁰ On ICTV the president of the company promised that each report would contain two different points of view.

Immediately after their protest the journalists were subject to concerted management attacks. Across almost all the main TV channels they were accused of being ‘dupes of the opposition’, of splitting their editorial teams, of being ‘holier-than-thou’ and not having the guts to simply quit their jobs. These attacks were reinforced by president Kuchma himself, who announced on October 29 during a visit to Chernigov that the journalists who signed the declaration were ‘a tiny number’ who considered themselves a ‘white race’ above other journalists. He said if they didn’t like where they worked they should leave and get other jobs.⁴¹

Indeed, that same day seven journalists at 1+1, the second largest channel, resigned in

desperation because they felt they didn’t have the support of other staff. They said they quit ‘after the failure of all our attempts to stop censorship’ on the channel. ‘We refuse to take part in a war of information declared by the power against its own people,’ said a declaration issued by the journalists, who called on the channel to ignore the temniki.

That same evening, however, a meeting of some 30 journalists from six central TV channels showed that activists were in good spirits and determined to fight on. The meeting agreed:

- To immediately picket any TV station that tried to sack journalists;
- To use ‘partisan’ methods (interrupting live broadcasts, departing from prepared texts, using sports and weather bulletins to broadcast news) in the event of major events going unreported during the election period, such as mass demonstrations, disturbances or repressive actions by the police or military.

In the second week of November the channel UT-1 refused to renew the contract of one of the journalists who had signed the statement; several other journalists were told they were no longer needed and could ‘take a rest’ from compiling news reports.

The journalists’ action was initiated by the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine (IMTUU). Three weeks previously the union had spoken to journalists at Inter, who said they were suffering and that staff were saying they were fed up with censorship. The statement then originated from a union meeting at Inter and was swiftly backed by ICTV and then Novyi Kanal. (The analogous statement by journalists in 2002 was the catalyst for the creation of the IMTUU.)⁴²

These protests were the harbinger of a major revolt that broke out among journalists after the second round of voting on November

21. They are a brilliant demonstration of the importance of long and often difficult trade union struggles in laying the groundwork for future breakthroughs.

On election day (Sunday, November 21) and the day after, four news readers on channel 1+1 refused to present election coverage due to 'crude' censorship of the news. The channel was forced to drop certain news bulletins altogether. This was the first sign that things were coming to a head on the central television stations.

On the morning of Wednesday, November 24, 14 news journalists on the First National channel, or UT-1, announced they were on strike and would not work on news stories that did not meet professional standards. They issued a signed public statement:

'To all citizens of Ukraine, all mass media in Ukraine and across the world, to all international missions and organizations, to diplomats, to all those who are not indifferent to the fate of the Ukrainian nation.

'WE, JOURNALISTS OF UT1 NEWS, ARE ON STRIKE

'For a month we have negotiated with management. We have tried to change the situation and give balanced and objective news. Unfortunately we didn't get the result we wanted. Management is powerless to influence the content of the news. In this they are breaking the law on information, which gives Ukrainians the right to objective, full information. We therefore consider such news illegitimate and want no part in its production.

'We want to remind you that national TV exists on tax-payers money. This money does not belong to the government or some other body, it is paid to the treasury by all citizens of Ukraine. Why should we, citizens ourselves,

broadcast dishonest and false information, working according to temniki and therefore be responsible for lies?

'Ukrainians, we have conquered our fear because there is an even stronger feeling: shame. We call on producers and editors to think hard about their duties to the people.'

But instead of walking out of the building, the striking journalists remained inside to argue with colleagues. Other journalists and staff signed up to the statement and by Thursday morning they numbered 330. The struggle was clearly intense: on Wednesday's mid-morning news bulletin viewers could hear shouts of 'Rubbish!' from inside the studio as the presenter read the news. A voice cut in: 'That's only the technicians, ignore it.'

The 11 o'clock news bulletin the next day went out with translation into sign language. But instead of following the newsreader, the signaller told the programme's 100,000 deaf viewers: 'The election results have been falsified. Don't believe them. Our president is Yushchenko. I'm sorry I've had to translate lies up to now, but I'm not doing it any more.'

On the afternoon of Thursday, November 25, reps from all UT-1's editorial departments met management with an ultimatum: either you let us broadcast what's happening in the country, or we all walk out. At 9pm the channel carried its first uncensored news bulletin.

'The day before there wasn't a single shot of the crowds on Kyiv's central square, nothing about Kyiv at all,' said Maxim Drabok, news reporter on the channel. 'There was a total information blockade -- people didn't know what they were voting for. But today there was objective information showing the mass of people, plus news about what had happened on the channel.'

‘Journalists and other staff in sport, culture and other departments all supported us. We had been fighting for over a month. Ten of us had signed the public declaration in October, then there was a battle for the airwaves: we had constant negotiations with the management.

‘We now have a promise from management – they understood that everyone had woken up. I always said to management that I respect you as journalists but not as bureaucrats. We convinced them that they are journalists first, not pen-pushers.

‘This afternoon representatives from all the editorial departments gathered in the foyer to read management a statement demanding objectivity. We gave them an ultimatum if they didn’t comply we would all go on strike and demand that the European Broadcasting Union exclude us from their membership.’

Olga Kashpor, a reporter and another of the original 14 who started the UT-1 snowball rolling, explains its dynamic: ‘News is the core around which the rest of the channel revolves, so the other staff realised they had to help. Today [Thursday] we reached a critical mass. We began to believe in ourselves, in what we could achieve.

‘Tonight the editors gave us full freedom – usually we’d simply carry out their orders. So we produced the programme among ourselves, helping each other as we went along. Yesterday I was very scared. Today we are all very happy.’

Inspired by what was happening on the streets and at UT-1, protests rolled through newsrooms in Kyiv. On Inter, the nation’s largest channel, a well-known presenter, Oleksander Lyukianenko, walked off the job because he was so disgusted with events. ‘We started with Yanukovych supporters, but an hour into the programme I

was told I had to keep on interviewing them. It went on like that for nearly five hours,’ he said.

‘Then to make matters worse they broadcast the programme on three channels simultaneously. It looked like I had betrayed my colleagues by going along with it. So during an ad break I got up and walked out.’

After Lyukianenko quit, journalists demanded a crisis meeting with the editor, which lasted several hours. The result was scrupulously balanced news bulletins on Thursday evening.

‘It astonished me,’ Lyukianenko said. ‘The broadcasts were fundamentally different from anything we’d seen in the last four years. They were balanced, gave different points of view, and the journalists didn’t follow a temnik.’

Andrei Tichina, a presenter on Channel 1+1, the second largest in Ukraine, told how his colleagues’ battle against the temniki also boiled during those critical days.

‘For two years the channel has been under political pressure. 1+1 was working under direct censorship. We tried to fight it, arguing over phrases, words, even commas. Before the first round of the elections seven of our journalists walked out. We have good relations with our management, but for many it had become morally untenable.

‘On the night of the elections we had planned a “marathon” with news and analysis. I and a colleague refused to present it, so Pekhovshik, the chief news editor, had to do it all.

‘On the next day all the other news presenters refused to work. In these extreme conditions, after long negotiations with the management, a decision was agreed to restart news but with no censorship. At 19.30 our first honest news was broadcast. It was a big victory.’

• 4.4 THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH⁴³

The breakthrough in the media came at a crucial time for the mass opposition movement. On Wednesday (November 24) Mr Yanukovich was officially announced the winner of the election, which came as an unexpected blow to the crowds on Kyiv's streets. At the same time, Russian politicians were calling openly for the East to split away, while the opposition leadership seemed unable to reach out to Yanukovich supporters.

On the day that the journalists' revolt seized the main television stations, Yulia Mostova, deputy editor of liberal weekly Zerkalo Nedeli (The Weekly Mirror), explained its potential significance for the further progress of the revolution: 'The TV broadcasts played on the ideological difference between east and west Ukraine. Yanukovich's entire political strategy was aimed at dividing the country. Now that journalists can work professionally and freely, people in the east will see that Yushchenko doesn't have hooves and a tail, that he doesn't wear a swastika. The TV has been responsible for fermenting division -- now it can re-unify the country.'

Andrei Shevchenko, news anchor on Channel 5, told the IFJ: 'It's a total breakthrough. It's a revolution on the TV -- today Ukrainian television started to work honestly for the first time.'

'Pekhovshik has been a symbol of censorship and manipulation for many years. But today the news on his channel began with a collective statement from the staff on the channel apologising for what they had done before. On Inter and UT-2 -- a citadel of the administration -- the editor in chief had no choice but to comply with the journalists' demands. For five years this has been unthinkable.'

'Most Ukrainians understood today that something new has started. People have been phoning in from the regions and asking us what's happened. They turned on the news and understood that the government is going to change. I can't imagine any other outcome.'

Mr Shevchenko compared the role of Channel 5 to that of Rustavi 2, the independent station that was influential during the 'velvet revolution' in Georgia a year before.

'We understand that our channel has made a huge contribution to what's happening. It's not just been the analysis and reporting, but also the live broadcasts without any commentary. The strength of these broadcasts were a massive driving force.'

'Yesterday Kuchma accused us of preparing the ground for a coup and said he was sorry he hadn't closed us down earlier. I think that's a compliment to us, coming from a man who has treated the media the way he has under his regime.'

Undoubtedly the journalists' revolt had a major impact on the subsequent course of events and helped contribute to Mr Yushchenko's eventual victory. It should be stressed, however, that journalists were not striking and protesting in favour of Mr Yushchenko; rather they were fighting for balanced editorial policies based on ethical, professional standards.

Moreover, in Eastern Ukraine the change in reporting on the main TV channels had a fairly marginal impact on the final election results. Sergei Harmash, editor of the Donetsk internet site Ostrov, said: 'If people are told the same thing for 10 years, they can't change their opinions in a few weeks. Emotion also plays a role. They have decided that Kyiv is lying: everything Kyiv says is treated as deception.'

It remains a fundamental weakness of the ‘Orange Revolution’ that it failed to get its message across to the East, and when it did, that message was not readily assimilated.

For journalists’ trade unions, there were plenty of lessons to draw from the Orange Revolution and their members’ action on the television.

‘Censorship had been weakened during the first round of the elections, when journalists saw they could do something about it,’ said Yegor Sobolev, the Kyiv organiser off the IMTUU. ‘After the second round people came together on separate channels and made mini-revolutions all on the same day. The hesitant majority suddenly took action, it was all rather unexpected.

‘Before the union got involved there had been individual protests in private, not public ones. But when we organised the 42 journalists to make a public statement in October it was an important psychological breakthrough. It’s one thing to argue with a manager, but quite another to accuse that manager publicly of being a censor. It showed that coming together and making a collective protest gets results.’

Since October the union increased its membership by about 50 per cent nationwide as protests gripped the media. The organisation is still small, however, and the big events of the past few months have revealed the scale of the tasks confronting it.

‘On the one hand we were successful in breaking down the censorship on the television,’ said Sergei Goos, the union’s national organiser. ‘But we haven’t consolidated and we haven’t tackled the economic roots of censorship – the low wages, the cash-in-hand payments made to journalists for writing what management wants, and the opaque structure of media ownership.

‘As the situation stabilises, it can slide backwards again. I feel the successes we have scored could easily be lost if we don’t take steps.’

The union adopted a neutral stance towards the two main candidates in the presidential battle. In the summer the executive decided it would take part in political action only when that action coincided with the union’s interests.

‘We chose neutrality because there was too much politicking, we didn’t want to discredit ourselves by getting involved in politics,’ Goos said.

That said, very few union members supported the prime minister and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych: ‘His methods of running the country don’t meet basic democratic standards.’

But most of the union’s members are also critical of Viktor Yushchenko – in many media that supported him journalists have faced redundancies and pressure to compromise their professional standards. Moreover, last December ‘Our Ukraine’, the opposition bloc led by Yushchenko, attempted to take control of the union by trying to install one of its MPs as leader. Yushchenko enjoys strong support among union activists in Kyiv, however.

‘In deciding on political neutrality we started from the strategic question: in what conditions would it be easier for our union to operate?’ Goos explains. ‘If Yanukovych had won, it would have been a black time for us. But Yushchenko’s win will also be difficult. He wants to open the country to private Western capital. If that happens I am sure half the journalists will lose their jobs.’

Despite the problems, Mr Sobolev emphasised the potential the revolution has opened up for

the union: 'Now I can phone the editor-in-chief of UT-1, and instead of him putting the phone down he talks to me. Every barrier has been broken. If initiatives are well organised then they are successful.'

5. Personal security of journalists

On the day of the first round of elections, October 31, the Crisis Centre run jointly by the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine and the IMTUU received reports of attacks on journalists. In Sumi (north-west Ukraine), at about 2pm a tear gas canister exploded outside offices housing the newspaper Panorama and a radio station: the gas injured several staff. At about 9pm a journalist working for Channel 5 was beaten up in Donetsk.

Although the IFJ saw no proof of whether these or other attacks were directly related to the election campaign, they were consistent with the pattern attacks on journalists that has been evident since the Gongadze case described in the introduction. These events added further pressure on journalists to self-censor their work.

During the final round of voting on December 26, the journalists' Crisis Centre reported far fewer infringements than during the first two rounds.

Ukraine's new presidency now faces the task of uprooting the structures and attitudes that have made Ukraine such a dangerous country for journalists in the past. The Gongadze case will be a litmus test for Mr Yushchenko's promises to democratise Ukraine and fulfil the expectations of the crowds that brought him to power. Continued failure to resolve it encourages abuses of power to silence and intimidate journalists. Without answers to the questions posed by the case:

- No citizen can have confidence in parliament, the judiciary and the executive;
- No journalist can feel safe to expose abuses of power;
- There can be no talk of genuine free speech in Ukraine.

There is prima facie evidence that, shortly before Gongadze's death, the Ukrainian president and other senior politicians discussed harming him. The fact that, more than four years later, this evidence has not been investigated and no framework has even been established for such an investigation, suggests that those in power still enjoy an unacceptable level of impunity with respect to alleged intimidation of journalists by murder and other violent means.

The reinstatement of former general prosecutor Svyatoslav Piskun in December 2004 has immediately raised the Gongadze issue: Mr Piskun's lawyer claimed Mr Piskun had originally been dismissed from his post because he had been making progress with the case.⁴⁴ Within a few days of his reinstatement, Mr Piskun reappointed one of his former deputies who had previously led investigations of the Gongadze case⁴⁵; Mr Piskun also referred to court a criminal case against former policemen charged with having committed kidnappings and murders for ransom. These former policemen included a key suspect in the Gongadze case.⁴⁶

Mr Piskun has made clear his readiness to return to these issues. We welcome his declared intentions. However, we note that since the political changes of November-December 2004 there has been no change in the official stance on the Melnychenko recordings. This has led to concern among journalists and human rights campaigners in Ukraine that an attempt will be made to defuse the issues raised by the Gongadze case.⁴⁷

6. Access to information

The Institute of Mass Information, which monitors infringements of journalists' rights, told the IFJ that it had not observed any significant increase in infringements during the election period (it registers some 13-14 such incidents every month). None of the opposition-friendly media we talked to complained about anything more than petty discrimination by the authorities in terms of access to information. Some mentioned, however, the obvious fact that politicians prefer to give comments to media that support them. This was also said to apply to the presidential administration, which allegedly preferred to talk to government-friendly newspapers.

Of greater concern to journalists was a repeat of events that had marred mayoral elections in Mukachevo (south-west Ukraine) in April 2004. There were reports of violence and intimidation at polling stations, and attacks on journalists.⁴⁸ Furthermore, over 100 people were issued with false press passes, enabling several such people to be present at each polling station. The presence of 'journalists' was then used as an excuse to deny access to genuine professionals.

The IMTUU received information that some 60 or 70 such passes had been issued in Dnepropetrovsk in September. The Committee of Voters of Ukraine, a legitimate non-governmental organisation, demanded 30,000 such 'press passes' to enable their representatives to monitor the polling stations on election day; the opposition youth organisation Pora also demanded them.

The threat that professional journalists would therefore be excluded from observing the electoral process, increasing the risk that falsifications would go unreported, led to a statement issued on October 25 by the Committee on Journalistic Ethics, headed by publisher Vladimir Mostovoi, calling on media

outlets not to issue false press passes to enable people to attend the counts.

After the first round of the elections the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine sent a strongly worded letter to president Kuchma, the minister of internal affairs, the general prosecutor and to candidates Yanukovich and Yushchenko, complaining of violations of journalists' rights on the election day and calling on them to ensure that these violations were not repeated at the second round.

In future elections it will be incumbent upon president Yushchenko's new administration to take the necessary steps.

7. Media ethics

Many serious and experienced journalists told the IFJ that the media in Ukraine were not merely out of balance, but were actually swamped by lies and distortions. Quite apart from a failure to present different points of view, important information was not presented at all while false information was given in its stead. The sheer quantity of television media under central government control was overwhelming. The protests by TV journalists described above reflected journalists' extreme dissatisfaction with the situation.

Such circumstances pose sharp ethical questions for journalists. As an editor on the opposition newspaper *Ukraina Moloda* expressed it: 'An independent journalist is an immoral journalist. It is an extreme situation. If someone is beating a child, you don't write about it, you intervene to stop the beating.'

The IFJ fully shares journalists' desire to redress the balance and expose lies and distortion. Indeed, we believe that journalists in Ukraine have an absolute responsibility to do this.

However, the IFJ is convinced that fundamental media ethical standards should be respected and followed by all sides and all media, and we recommend our Ukrainian colleagues to focus on this aspect. This is of particular importance in the post-election period when there are calls to sack journalists in pro-Yanukovich media, raising the unfortunate possibility that pro-Yanukovich bias in the media could be replaced by equally uncritical bias in favour of Yushchenko.

The professional obligation of journalists to present correct and balanced information to the public is universal, and failure to do so

will eventually only serve as a justification for violations in government-controlled media.

To follow the analogy used by the Ukraina Moloda journalist, Ukrainian democracy has been beaten up by powerful groups and individuals. It is therefore the journalist's professional duty to defend the right of Ukrainian citizens to communicate their views in the main, state-controlled broadcast media. It is the journalist's professional obligation to correct distortions and lies wherever they may appear.

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

The key question facing the media in Ukraine is whether journalists are able to fulfil their professional obligation to provide the population with clear, accessible information about important events that affect their lives. The answer currently is mixed: in some parts of the country and in some media the situation is tolerable and has been improved by the 'Orange Revolution', while in others -- particularly in the East -- it remains a cause for deep concern.

The impact of the journalists' protests will not be forgotten quickly. But to assume that the success of the Orange Revolution means journalists will no longer be subjected to pressure from politicians or from the powerful oligarchs eager to defend their interests, would be a huge mistake. All politicians, even those with the most outstanding democratic credentials, seek to influence and control media.

To ensure that the euphoria of the elections and the protests are not quickly forgotten journalists must take immediate steps to create

structures in their media that protect them from the external pressure and manipulation.

Key to this process is strengthening the solidarity among journalists. Solidarity was essential to the success of the protests as journalists stood together to demand their rights. Solidarity will continue to be crucial to the future if journalists are to successfully defend their profession. Journalists must join their union, demand decent working conditions and insist on respect for their professional rights. Good working conditions breed good journalism, good unions also protect professional rights.

The union must negotiate with management on professional rights within the newsroom. Editorial Statutes that protect journalistic independence are essential tools, but only effective if journalists are prepared to insist on their enforcement.

Journalists must also renew support for professional structures that regulate media ethics and protect media from repressive legislation and practices that obstruct the media.

Journalists must also demand pluralism and transparency of ownership. The national broadcasters are mostly privately owned, yet owned by oligarchs that were too close to the authorities. This enabled the authorities to claim a pluralistic media landscape while actually having direct control over all national broadcasters save Channel 5.

At the same time journalists must demand anti monopoly legislation that restricts media concentration and places sensible limits on foreign ownership. Throughout the former communist countries of central and eastern Europe, transition has resulted in up to 90% of the print media being foreign owned, and in some countries owned by one foreign company. Such developments have raised enormous questions about pluralism and independence which are beyond the control of national interests.

Journalists should demand public broadcasting that sets in place the conditions for broadcasting that serves the public and is freed from political and commercial interests

Finally, journalists must demand an end to impunity currently enjoyed by those who have beaten and killed journalists for their work. Journalists cannot be free while they work in fear of intimidation, violence and murder. Resolving the Gongadze case is obviously crucial. In addition, journalists should insist on full and thorough investigations of all acts of violence against journalists.

We therefore recommend that the Ukrainian national government and local authorities:

- Disengage from media control at national and regional levels and implement policies that promote public broadcasting free of political and commercial interests⁴⁹;
- Take steps to improve the distribution and plurality of media throughout the country and end the damaging division between the north-west and south-east in terms of the accessibility of different media;
- Implement regulations that guarantee transparency of ownership, restrict media concentration and place sensible limits on foreign ownership;
- Support efforts to strengthen self regulation on journalists' ethics and end restrictions to media freedom including improving access to information;
- Support the rights of journalists to organise into trade unions that fight illegal employment practices and defend professional rights;
- End the climate of impunity for those who attack journalists by bringing the killers of Georgy Gongadze and all other journalist victims to justice;
- Commit themselves to prevent the return of temniki and to cease all pressure on journalists who refuse to break codes of professional ethics.

We recommend that international journalists' and media freedom organisations:

- Continue to monitor violations of journalists' rights and physical attacks against journalists and support the campaign to end the impunity of the murderers of journalists;
- Support the work of the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine and the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine through exchanging advice and information, coordinating joint campaigns and training these organisations' activists;
- Support and provide training of journalists in the fundamentals of media ethics.

We recommend that owners and controllers of Ukrainian media outlets:

- Cease all pressure on journalists who refuse to break codes of professional ethics;
- Establish and agree with their journalists and with journalists' organisations codes of ethical conduct and standards of editorial freedom and integrity.

We recommend that the Council of Europe and the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe and European Union:

- Continue to pressure Ukraine government to institute a comprehensive programme of media reform. That reform should ensure the development of a pluralistic, diverse and independent media landscape that respects the rights of journalists to act professionally without fear of retribution.

We recommend that Ukrainian journalists' organisations:

- Closely monitor the media situation, especially on the national broadcasters, and protest at every identifiable violation of media ethics and journalists' rights.
- Continue to encourage journalists to press their employers and the government for locally and nationally agreed codes of ethical conduct and standards of editorial freedom and integrity.
- Agree a manifesto for media reform that can be supported by all Ukrainian journalists and media groups. This should included:
- The right to organise in the defence of social and professional rights;
- An end to illegal and corrupt working practices and creation of decent working conditions;
- The implementation of editorial statutes that respect journalistic independence and journalists' code of conduct;

- A system of Self-regulation and free access to information for media;
- Guarantees of pluralism, limits on concentration of ownership and transparency of ownership;
- The creation of genuine public broadcasting;
- An end to impunity.

The IFJ would like to thank the two members of the mission, David Crouch and Uffe Gardel for the time, effort and expertise they invested in the mission and again to David Crouch for returning on two further occasions before compiling the final report.

The IFJ would further like to thank Sergey Guz, Chair of the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine and Igor Lubchenko, President of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, and their colleagues Oksana Vynnychuk and Oleksandr Kyrylenko for their assistance in organising the mission and their contributions to the battle for press freedom in Ukraine.

Finally, the IFJ thanks the Open Society Institute for providing support for the mission.

Appendix

The mission met or spoke with the following:

AUTHORITIES AND ORGANISATIONS:

Serhiy Goos, president, and Yegor Sobelev, Kyiv organiser, All-Ukrainian Independent Media Trade Union (formerly the Confederation of Independent Media Trade Unions)

Vice minister Anatolyi Prisyazhnyuk, Ministry of Internal Affairs

Head of the Central Election Commission, Serhey Kivalov

Serhiy Taran, director, Institute of Mass Information

PRINT MEDIA:

Editor in chief, Ivan Spodarenko, and members of the editorial staff at the privately owned daily newspaper Silski Vesti, Kyiv

Editor in chief, Anatolyi Gorlov, at Holos Ukrainy, the daily newspaper of the Ukrainian Parliament

Members of the editorial staff of the privately owned daily newspaper Ukraina Moloda, Kyiv

Editor in chief, Stepan Kurpil, and members of the editorial staff at the privately owned daily newspaper Vysoky Zamok, Lviv

Editor in chief, Oleg Bazar, at the privately owned daily newspaper Lvivska Gazeta, Lviv

Editor in chief, Vasil Nazaruk, and members of the editorial staff at the partly municipally owned newspaper Galychyna, Ivano-Frankivsk

Round table of journalists from various mass media

Volodymyr Boyko, formerly a reporter on Salon and now based in Kyiv

Sergei Harmash, a journalist on the independent internet publication Ostrov, Donetsk

Natalia Stativko, editor of the online magazine Obiektiv-No, Kharkiv (telephone interview)

Yevgen Polozhi, editor in chief of the newspaper Panorama, Sumi (telephone interview)

Igor Voron, journalist on the newspaper Sobytiya, Dnipropetrovsk (telephone interview)

Yulia Mostova, deputy editor of liberal weekly Zerkalo Nedeli (telephone interview)

The mission also conferred in Kyiv with Valeryi Ivanov, president of the Ukrainian Press Academy, and with Federica Prina, Europe Programme Officer, Article 19.

BROADCAST MEDIA

President Oleksander Savenko and vice presidents Gennadiy Radchenko and Yevhen Kaleskyi at the state TV, National Television Company of Ukraine, Kyiv

Managing director Vladislav Lyasovskyi and members of the editorial staff who began a hunger strike at the privately owned TV company Channel 5, Kyiv

Commercial director Yuliya Zvolinska at the privately owned TV station Mist, Lviv

Member of the editorial staff at the municipally owned TV station Vezha, Ivano-Frankivsk

Journalists on central TV channels in Kyiv who signed an appeal against biased news reporting

Maxim Drabok, news reporter on TV channel UT-1 (telephone interview)

Olga Kashpor, a reporter on UT-1 (telephone interview)

Oleksander Lyukianenko, a well-known presenter on TV channel Inter (telephone interview)

Andrei Tichina, a presenter on channel 1+1 (telephone interview)

Andrei Shevchenko, news anchor on Channel 5 (telephone interview)

Footnotes

- 1 Statement by Article 19, Kyiv, October 27, 2004
- 2 Available at <http://www.ifj.org/default.asp?index=2808&Language=EN>
- 3 Some of this is compiled in Andrew Wilson's *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, Yale, 2002, pp253-278.
- 4 International Federation of Journalists, National Union of Journalists of the UK and Ireland, Gongadze Foundation, Institute of Mass Information: *Press Freedom and the Murder of Georgy Gongadze: Memorandum to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe*, October 2004
- 5 UNIAN news agency, Kyiv, in Ukrainian, November 19, 2004
- 6 Letter from IPI to President Leonid Kuchma, December 17, 2003, www.freemedia.at/Protests2003/Ukraine17.12.03.htm
- 7 *Ukrainska Pravda*, January 12, 2004
- 8 Article 19, *Ukraine Bulletin*, January-April 2004
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 Article 19, *Ukraine Bulletin*, May-August 2004
- 11 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Assessment Visit to Ukraine, June 2004; Article 19, *Ukraine Bulletin*, May- August 2004
- 12 Interview with Sholokh in *Ukrayina Moloda*, March 11, 2004
- 13 *Ukrainska Pravda*, January 12, 2004
- 14 Interview with editor-in-chief Ivan Spodarenko and other members of the editorial staff, Kyiv, October 25, 2004
- 15 'Anti-Semitism in Ukrainian media up, and its acceptance is worrying Jews', JTA Global News Service, September 21, 2004, available at www.jta.org. The Va'ad remained politically neutral during the election period.
- 16 Interview with the paper's staff, *op. cit.*
- 17 Article 19, *Ukraine Bulletin*, January-April 2004
- 18 Statement by Article 19, Kyiv, October 27, 2004
- 19 Monitoring Politichnikh Novin: Osnovny Resultati, Ukrainian Press Academy, October 2004
- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 Interview with Oleksander Savenko (president) and vice presidents Gennadiy Radchenko and Yevhen Kaleskyi, National Television Company of Ukraine, Kyiv, October 25, 2004
- 22 Interview with Anatolyi Gorlov, Kyiv, October 25, 2004
- 23 Interview with editorial staff, Kyiv, October 26, 2004
- 24 Interview with Sergei Taran, Kyiv, October 28, 2004
- 25 Information from conversations with television journalists in Kyiv
- 26 Interview in Kyiv, October 26, 2004
- 27 Interview with Stepan Kurpil, editor in chief of *Vysoky Zamok*, Lviv, October 27, 2004
- 28 Interview with Oleg Bazar, editor in chief of *Lvivska Gazeta*, Lviv, October 27, 2004
- 29 Interview with Volodymyr Boyko, Kyiv, December 30, 2004
- 30 See, for example, 'Skol'ko stoit slovo,' published by the independent Donetsk website Ostrov on December 8, 2004 (http://www.ostro.org/shownews_tema.php?id=441)
- 31 Interview with Volodymyr Boyko, Kyiv, December 30, 2004. See also Andrew Wilson's discussion of the 1999 elections in Wilson, 'Unexpected Nation', *op. cit.*, pp200-204.
- 32 *Donbass* (newspaper), in Russian, December 28, 2004
- 33 Interview with Sergei Harmash in Donetsk, December 29, 2004
- 34 Telephone interview with Natalya Stativko, November 21, 2004
- 35 Press reports and telephone interviews with journalists in Sumi, Kharkiv and Nikolaev, November 21, 2004
- 36 Article 19, *Ukraine Bulletin*, May-August 2004
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 Interviews with Vladislav Lyasovskyi (director), Andrei Shevchenko (news director) Alyona Matuzko (press officer), Channel 5, Kyiv, October 25 and 28, 2004
- 39 The information in this section is based on telephone interviews on November 25, 2004, with the journalists quoted below. Some of this information was subsequently published in *The Independent* (London) on November 29.
- 40 *Ukrainska Pravda*, October 30, 2004
- 41 *Ukrainska Pravda*, October 29, 2004
- 42 Interview with representatives of the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine, Kyiv, October 30, 2004
- 43 Based on interviews with the journalists quoted below, Kyiv, November-December 2004
- 44 UNIAN news agency, Kyiv, in Ukrainian, December 10, 2004
- 45 *Ukrayinska Pravda* web site, in Ukrainian, December 15, 2004
- 46 UNIAN news agency, Kyiv, in Ukrainian, January 13, 2005
- 47 See, for example, the article by Volodymyr Boiko, www.ord.com.ua/categ_1/article_3188.html, in Ukrainian, December 12, 2004
- 48 Article 19, *Ukraine Bulletin*, May-August 2004
- 49 The IFJ stresses that this recommendation does not imply privatisation of media outlets. As the Russian experience demonstrates most graphically, privatisation does not guarantee media freedom.



'Revolution in the News' - The Story Behind Ukraine's Newsroom Revolt



The IFJ is the world's largest organisation of journalists with members in more than 117 countries. Today the IFJ spans the world with a range of programmes and solidarity activities that help to strengthen journalists' trade unions. IFJ Offices around the world highlight the need for safety of journalists. The Federation has opened offices in Algeria, Palestine and Colombia to provide local support for journalists most in need.

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